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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JEFFREY K. JOHNSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060602-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant is awaiting trial on the charge of retaliation against a judge, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-316(1) (West 2004). In two pretrial orders, 
the trial court denied defendant's motion to quash the bindover and defendant's motion in 
limine to exclude evidence. Defendant petitioned for interlocutory review of both orders, 
which this Court granted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Denial of Motion to Quash the Bindover: Must the prosecution prove that 
defendant intended for his alleged threats to assault or murder a judge to be communicated 
to the judge; and, does the preliminary hearing evidence establish probable cause to support 
the bindover? The determination of the elements of a crime is a question of law, that is 
reviewed de novo and without deference to the trial court's raling. State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 
149,151 (UtahApp. 1997). Whether evidence supports a bindover is also a question of law, 
is reviewed for correctness, but with "some deference" accorded to any subsidiary credibility 
or factual findings . State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, \ 29, 137 P.3d 787. 
2. Denial of Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence: Has defendant established that 
statements he made to his attorney, allegedly threatening to kill two judges and opposing 
counsel, are privileged under rule 504, Utah Rule of Evidence; and, did defendant waive any 
claim of privilege by stipulating to the admission of the statements at the preliminary 
hearing? The determination of privilege is a question of law, reviewed for correctness on 
appeal; but because privilege is highly fact-dependent, its existence is best determined on a 
case-by-case basis. Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74, \ 6, 984 P.2d 980. Waiver was not raised 
below, but is now raised by the State as an alternative ground to affirm. Gardner v. Galetka, 
2004UT42,t8,94P.3d263. 
STATUTES. RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
At issue are Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-316 (West 2004) and rules 504 and 507 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. See Addendum A for the full text of these and other provisions cited 
in the argument. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 21,2005, defendant was charged in the Sixth Judicial District with two 
counts of retaliation against a judge, third degree felonies, in violation of section 76-8-316(1) 
(R. 6-7). See Add. A (Statute). The first count alleged that on September 13, 2005, during 
a conversation with his divorce attorney, Joy Jelte, defendant threatened to kill Judge Paul 
2 
D. Lyman (id.). The second count alleged that on September 16, 2005, during a tape-
recorded telephone conversation with Jelte, defendant threatened to kill Judge David L. 
Mower (id.).1 
Fifth Judicial District Court Judge Wallace Lee conducted a preliminary hearing in 
the Sixth Judicial District (R. 31-33). The parties agreed that foundational testimony could 
be admitted by proffer. The proffer was that a detective was contacted by Jelte and provided 
a written summary of four conversations Jelte had with defendant and a tape-recording of one 
of those conversations (R252: 9-11). After the proffer was made and accepted, defendant 
stipulated to the admission of Exhibit 1, Jelte's written summary of threats she heard 
defendant make on June 27 and September 13, 16, and 19,2005, to assault or murder Doug 
Neeley, the opposing counsel in defendant's divorce case, and to assault or murder Judges 
Paul Lyman and David Mower, who had made rulings in the divorce action (R252: 10-13). 
See Addendum B (Exhibit 1). Defendant also stipulated to the admission of Exhibit 2, Jelte's 
tape-recording of the September 16 telephone conversation (id.). See Addendum C (Official 
Transcript of Exhibit 2). Defendant did not claim that Exhibits 1 and 2 contained privileged 
information which was inadmissible. To the contrary, he asked the magistrate to fully 
consider the contents of the exhibits in ruling on defendant's motions to dismiss Count I and 
for change of venue (R. 36-50, 55-59; R252: 1-13). 
]This is an interlocutory appeal. Defendant, therefore, is presumed innocent and 
any "facts" are simply allegations. The State will not continue to add "alleged" in this 
brief, but recognizes that its factual assertions are unproved. 
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On December 7, 2005, Judge Lee granted defendant's motion to dismiss Count I 
because the preliminary hearing evidence established that the threat to assault or murder 
Judge Lyman occurred on September 16, and not September 13, as charged (R. 61-66).2 
Judge Lee bound defendant over on Count II, charging defendant with retaliation against 
Judge Mower (R. 63, 99). 
The magistrate concluded that section 76-8-316(1), the statute under which defendant 
was charged, has three elements: (1) a defendant (2) threatens to assault or murder a judge 
(3) with the intent to either impede, intimidate or interfere with the judge while engaged in 
the performance of the judge's official duties, or with the intent to retaliate against the judge 
on account of those official duties (R. 63). The magistrate rejected defendant's argument that 
section 76-8-316 has a fourth element, that is, proof that the defendant intended for the threat 
to be communicated to the judge (R. 62). 
The magistrate granted defendant's motion for change of venue to Salt Lake County 
(R. 64). In the Third Judicial District, defendant moved to quash the bindover of Count II 
(R. 119). Defendant again claimed that section 76-8-316 has a fourth element, but also 
argued that an "intent to impede, influence, intimidate, or retaliate" necessarily requires proof 
2The State has since moved to amend the information to allege September 16 (R. 
135-36, 143-45). That motion is pending in the trial court. 
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that he intended for Judge Mower to learn of the threats (R. 125-28,162-68). Judge Stephen 
Henriod denied the motion to quash (R. 229).3 See Addendum D (Ruling). 
Defendant also moved in limine to exclude "privileged statements Defendant is 
alleged to have made to his attorney, Joy Jelte" (R. 147-50,218-223). Defendant argued that 
Jelte's written summary of conversations (Preliminary Hearing Exhibit 1), Jelte's tape-
recording of one conversation (Preliminary Hearing Exhibit 2), and any testimony by Jelte 
concerning the threats should all be excluded from admission at trial because the 
conversations fell within the attorney-client privilege, rule 504, Utah Rules of Evidence (id.). 
See Add. A (Rule). The State responded that the threats did not fall within the privilege rule 
and then, as part of the motion in limine hearing, called Jelte to testify to the circumstances 
surrounding the taping of the September 16 telephone conversation (R. 179-82; R253: 12-
18). Judge Henriod ruled that defendant's statements to Jelte were not privileged and denied 
defendant's motion to exclude them from trial (R. 224-27). See Addendum E (Memorandum 
Decision). 
3The ruling is minimal. The court rejected the existence of a fourth element and, 
apparently, viewed defendant's claim of lack of intent as a factual issue for the jury (R. 
229). The brevity of the formal order derives from the judge's handwritten comment 
made as a minute entry, that indicated that the motion was denied and directed the 
prosecutor to prepare a formal order (R. 146). No formal order was prepared, however, 
until defendant petitioned for interlocutory review some months later. At that time, a 
summary formal order-parroting the handwritten comment—was entered (R. 229). In 
any case, what constitutes the elements of an offense is legal question, decided de novo 
onappeal. Fixel, 945 P.2d at 151. 
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Defendant timely petitioned for and was granted interlocutory review of the denial of 
the motion to quash and the denial of the motion in limine (R. 236). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS4 
Defendant told Joy Jelte, his long-time divorce attorney, that he had "given up on the 
legal system" and that he now intended to "work outside the law" (R. 4). He was threatening 
to assault or murder opposing counsel and the judges involved in his divorce case (id.), but 
was he serious? Jelte was not sure, but she found his comments "very, very troubling" 
(R253: 15). 
Jelte had represented defendant in his first divorce in 1996 (R253: 13-14). For the 
past three years, since December 2002, she had represented him in his second divorce (R254: 
14). She viewed defendant not just as a client, but also as a friend (R254: 24). But she was 
now "very concerned about what he was communicating to her" (R253: 15). 
Defendant's second divorce trial ended in March 2005 (R253:14). Opposing counsel, 
Doug Neeley, had prepared proposed findings and a decree (R253: 16). In June 2005, 
defendant told Jelte that the real problem in the divorce was "leaving [Neeley] alive" (R. 4). 
Jelte had filed objections to Neeley's proposed findings and a hearing was set for 
Monday, September 19,2005, before Judge Mower (R253:16). On September 13,2005, the 
Tuesday before the hearing, defendant, who now lived in New Mexico, telephoned Jelte (R. 
4The alleged facts are taken from Preliminary Hearing Exhibit 1 (R. 1-5) and 
Preliminary Hearing Exhibit 2 (R. 254: 2-24), copies of which attached in Addenda B & 
C, respectively. 
6 
4). He again told her that Neeley 's "life will end" and then opined that Judges Paul Lyman 
and David Mower, judges in the divorce action, were "right up there" with Neeley (id.). Jelte 
tried to clarify what defendant meant and asked if he planned "to kill, shoot or bomb 
someone" (id.). Defendant would not tell her, but volunteered that he did not care "if he was 
caught" or if he went to prison (id.). He told her that he wanted "justice," but insisted 
"justice" could only happen "outside the law" (id.). 
Jelte had been an attorney for 17 years and had handled many family and domestic 
cases, but found defendant's comments usual (R253: 13, 15). Although defendant lived in 
New Mexico, he planned on returning to Utah for the September 19 hearing. Jelte decided 
that she would telephone defendant in New Mexico on September 16, the Friday before the 
Monday hearing, and tape-record the call to make sure she was "hearing him correctly and 
clearly" (R253: 14-15). If defendant repeated his earlier threats, she "would have the 
opportunity to ponder and think about the appropriate course of action to take" (id.). 
She called defendant Friday night (R253:14). She told him that she needed to discuss 
his concerns regarding the proposed findings before Monday, but wanted to first review a 
transcript and the case file (R254: 2 & 4). She explained that she would call him back on 
Sunday once she was "up to speed" and they would then discuss specifics (R253: 17; R254: 
2&4).5 
5The official transcript (R. 254) has no page 3; however, it does not appear that any 
part of the conversation is omitted. 
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She then asked him if he was feeling any better emotionally and if he had enjoyed a 
recent visit with his son (R253: 5; R254: 4-6). Defendant volunteered, "I think the Court 
system in Utah is screwed up" (R254: 6). He then renewed his tirade against the court 
system, including Judges Mower and Lyman and attorney Neeley. 
Defendant threatened that because Neeley "took away my kids. I'll take away his 
kids" (R254: 14). But this could be avoided, if Neeley paid him $150,000 that defendant 
believed was unfairly taken from him in the divorce (R254:16). Defendant realized that was 
"not going to happen. So there's just life, liberty and justice for all" (id.). Defendant was 
"tired of being "f—ked with. . . tired of it" (id.). And it was not just Neeley. Defendant felt 
Judge Lyman was "an asshole" and "a piece of shit" (R254: 8). 
Defendant was also upset with Judge Mower, whom defendant called "a slime ball 
. . . a liar . . . unethical... a hypocrite" (R254: 6). Defendant said Judge Mower was "the 
one that signed the protective order for [defendant's wife] to go remove everything except 
for my personal shaving articles, and steel. He won't give them back. So I think he can 
make up for that" (R254: 15). 
Defendant told Jelte that he had "no faith in the Court system . . . no faith in it at all. 
The only way it's ever going to be fair is when people make it fair" (R254: 7). He believed 
that if he wanted "justice," he needed to "handle it by myself (R254: 9, 16). He just was 
"not going to take it no more," he had "had it" (R254: 9). He warned, "After one, the rest 
are free" (id.). 
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Defendant realized that "they" could put him "in jail for 60 days.. . for a year... and 
all it's going to do is piss [him] off more. They [could] take away [his] guns, and all it's 
going to do is piss [him] off more" (R254: 9-10). When Jelte reminded defendant of the 
effect his threatened actions would have on his children, defendant said he did not care; he 
did not plan on seeing them again (R254: 10). Jelte questioned whether defendant was 
suicidal. Defendant denied that he was, but said he might be later but, "[o]nly after I take out 
a bunch of people with me. I'm not going to go by myself. I can guarantee it" (R254: 10). 
He wanted to "[g]o out with a bang" (R254: 17). He again told Jelte that even if "they catch 
up with me, after one, the rest are free. Yep, I'll make my mark" (id.). 
Defendant opined that if more people felt like he did, the court system would change 
for the better: "If 20 years ago, if 5 years ago, if 10 years ago men would stand up and say, 
'You know what? I'm tired of being screwed by Utah,' and take action on their own, maybe 
somebody would say, 'You know what? Maybe this isn't right. We're getting Judges 
knocked off left and right. Maybe this isn't right'" (R254: 11). 
Defendant told Jelte that he knew what he needed to do: "If I can get four or five 
people in Sanpete and Sevier County and they take me out, it's a better world isn't it? . . . 
And if I can take out their DNA offspring, it's even better " (R254: 12). Jelte warned 
defendant "all you're going to do is break your parents' heart and devastate your children" 
(id.). She told him, "You're too good a man for that. You're upset right now" (id.). 
Defendant disagreed. He said, "I've been upset for years. I'm past upset. I want justice" 
9 
(id.). Jelte continued to try to dissuade him from taking any action (R254: 12-13). 
Defendant then volunteered, "You know what? I told my buddy about it. I've got a 
pretty close friend, and he told me - he said, 'You're know what, you're not going to get 
caught, but you're going to go to hell" (R 254: 13). Defendant told him, "It's worth it" (id.). 
When Jelte asked three times who the friend was, defendant replied, "Nobody. Nobody else 
needs to be in this" (R254: 13-14). Jelte probed for specifics of what defendant was 
planning, but he refused to tell her: "I don't think I'll tell you, you know. It won't benefit 
you, and I know it won't benefit me if I tell you" (R254: 15). 
Jelte encouraged defendant to seek psychological counseling, but he refused (id.). He 
told her, "There's no need to worry, Joy. My mind is made up. I'm not suicidal. I'm not. 
I have a really good life down here [in New Mexico]. I have fun all the time, you know. It's 
just you know what? There will be justice" (R254: 20). 
Defendant explained that the judges in his case had hurt him by refusing to follow the 
law (R254: 22). Defendant warned Jelte that as far as he was concerned, it is an "equal 
playing field": "[wjhat's fair for the goose is good for the gander. I'll play by their rules [but 
if] they refuse to follow the law, so be it" (R254: 22-23). Defendant continued to argue with 
Jelte. He insisted that he was not being "stupid," but "talking justice. I'm talking principle 
. . . what's just is just" (R254: 23). He said, "If I leave it alone, things are just going to go 
on as usual. It's just going to keep happening to somebody else. Judges refuse to follow the 
law, and attorney-yep. You know what? It's got to end sometime" (R254: 24). Jelte 
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pleaded with defendant to think about what he was threatening. She told him: "I'm sincere 
as your friend, as your lawyer, as a friend to your parents, as a friend even to your kids, I 
really want you to snap out of it, Jeff, You know better" (R254: 24,21). Defendant replied, 
"Well, I don't have anything planned in the near future" (id.). The tape then ran out (id.). 
Three days later, on Monday, September 19, 2005, defendant appeared in Judge 
Mower's courtroom for the scheduled hearing (R. 5). Defendant "confronted Doug Neeley" 
in the courtroom and demanded that the attorney pay him back $150,000 (id.). Law 
enforcement officers observed the encounter and defendant's "agitated state" (R. 1-2). As 
Jelte left the courtroom with defendant, he turned to her and said, "that asshole is going to 
die and all of his family" (R. 5). 
Jelte contacted the police and provided them with a written summary of defendant's 
threats from June through September (Preliminary Hearing Exhibit 1) and a tape-recording 
of her telephone conversation with defendant on the previous Friday (Preliminary Hearing 
Exhibit 2). Defendant was immediately arrested (R. 2, 6-7). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Denial of Motion to Quash: The bindover in this case was proper because probable 
cause established the three requisite elements of section 76-8-316(1): (1) defendant (2) 
threatened to assault or murder Judge Mower (3) with the intent to retaliate against the judge 
on account of his official actions in defendant's divorce case. Contrary to defendant's 
assertions, it is not necessary to also prove that he intended for the judge to learn of the 
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threats. Indeed, courts which have addressed the question—including those cited by 
defendant—have not interpreted the phrase "with the intent to retaliate" as requiring proof 
that the judge learn of the threat or proof that the defendant expected and wanted the judge 
to learn of the threat. Instead, as in this case, communication of the threat to a third party is 
sufficient. Consequently, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to quash the 
bindover. 
Denial of Motion in Limine: Not all statements made by a client to an attorney are 
privileged. Instead, the attorney-client privilege, set out in rule 504, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
protects only "confidential communications"—those communications not intended to be 
disclosed to third parties—which are made "for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of 
professional legal services." In this case, defendant's statements to his attorney that he 
intended to assault or murder two judges and opposing counsel are not privileged. The 
statements were never confidential because defendant had previously made the same 
statements to a third-party, "his buddy," before repeating the statements to his attorney. The 
statements were also not made to facilitate the obtaining of legal advice or other legitimate 
legal services. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion in limine to 
exclude their admission at trial. 
Alternatively, defendant waived his right to claim privilege. Rule 507, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, recognizes that the holder of a privilege waives his right to assert the privilege 
when he "consents to the disclosure" of the privileged information. Here, it is undisputed 
12 
that defendant stipulated at the preliminary hearing to the admission of Exhibits 1 and 2, both 
of which reveal significant, if not all, portions of the information he now claims is privileged. 
Because defendant failed to assert the privilege at preliminary hearing, he is precluded from 
reasserting it at trial Consequently, this Court may affirm the denial of the motion in limine 
on this alternative ground, which is apparent in the record, without determining if 
defendant's threats were actually privileged. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SECTION 76-8-316(1) DOES NOT REQUIRE PROOF THAT 
DEFENDANT INTENDED FOR HIS THREATS TO BE 
COMMUNICATED TO THE JUDGE; AND, IN ANY CASE, THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE BINDOVER 
Defendant was charged with retaliation against a judge, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-316(1) (West 2004). That provision reads: 
A person is guilty of a third degree felony if the person threatens to assault, 
kidnap, or murder a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole 
with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the judge or a member 
of the board while engaged in the performance of the judge's or member's 
official duties or with the intent to retaliate against the judge or member on 
account of the performance of those official duties. 
See Add. A for complete text. In this case, the information alleges that defendant threatened 
to assault or murder Judge Mower with the intent to retaliate against the judge on account of 
the judge's official actions in defendant's divorce case (R. 6-7). The other variation of the 
crime—threatening to assault, kidnap, or murder a judge with the intent to impede, 
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intimidate, or interfere with the judge while engaged in the performance of his duties—is not 
charged and is not at issue.6 
Defendant asserts that insufficient evidence supports the bindover because the 
prosecution failed to prove that he intended "to influence a judge with the threat." See Brief 
of Appellant [Br.Aplt. ] at 1, 8,11 -12. According to defendant, "a person cannot utter a threat 
with the intent or expectation that the threat will influence or punish the judge if there is no 
foreseeable way for the judge to learn of the threat." Id. at 9-10. Defendant argues that the 
preliminary hearing evidence here did not establish that he instructed Jelte to tell the judge 
of his threats or that Jelte told defendant she would report the threats. Id. at 11. 
Consequently, he claims it was error to deny his motion to quash the bindover. Id. at 12-17. 
Defendant is incorrect. As a matter of law, the prosecution is not required to prove 
that defendant intended the threat to be communicated to the judge. Moreover, the 
preliminary hearing evidence establishes probable cause to support all elements of the crime. 
This Court has previously determined that section 76-8-316(1) has only three 
elements. As applied here, those elements are: (1) defendant (2) threatened to assault or 
6Below, defendant argued that the two intent variants could not be "split" and that 
whatever was required by one must be required by the other (R253: 11). On appeal, 
defendant continues to treat the two intents as one. See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.] at 8-
12. But the statute's plain language and use of a disjunctive establish their differences. 
Cf. State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 152 (Utah App. 1997) (distinguishing between the two 
variants and recognizing that the first variant encompasses intimidating a judge to grant 
more favorable rulings in the future, while the second variant proscribes threatening to 
assault or otherwise harm a judge because of a past ruling). 
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murder Judge Mower (3) with the intent to retaliate against the judge on account of the 
judge's past rulings in defendant's divorce case. See State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 150 n.l 
& 152 (finding a jury instruction setting out similar elements as "beyond reproach"). 
In moving to quash the bindover order, defendant argued that Fixel imposed a fourth 
element: "(4) and the Defendant reasonably expected that the judge would learn of the threat" 
(R. 126). Alternatively, defendant argued that such proof was "logically" required by the 
plain language of the third statutory element, intent to retaliate (R. 126-27, 163). The trial 
court denied the motion (R. 146, 229). 
On appeal, defendant no longer claims that Fixel imposes a separate fourth element. 
See Br.Aplt. at 7-12. Instead, he claims only that the third element-intent to retaliate-cannot 
be established without proof that defendant intended for the judge to learn of his threats. See 
Br.Aplt. at 9-11. He also claims that the preliminary hearing evidence does not establish his 
intent for the threats to be communicated to the judge. See Br.Aplt. at 12-17. Neither the 
plain language of the statute nor cases interpreting the same or similarly-worded statutes 
support defendant's legal and factual claims. 
A. The Preliminary Hearing Evidence Establishes Probable Cause of the 
First and Second Elements, that is, that Defendant Threatened to 
Assault and Murder Judge Mower. 
Defendant concedes that he threatened to assault or murder Judge Mower. See 
Br.Aplt. at 13. But an examination of the requirements of the second statutory element— 
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threatening to assault or murder a judge—clarifies what is required by the third element of 
"with the intent to retaliate." 
A "threat" is "an expression of an intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage on 
another." See United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990) 
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Section 76-8-316(1) limits its application to threats 
to assault, kidnap, or murder a judge or other designated official, but does not require that 
the threat be "real." Fbcel, 945 P.2d at 152. A credible "bluff to assault, kidnap, or murder 
is sufficient. See id. Consequently, section 76-8-316(1) requires no proof of a defendant's 
actual intention to carry out the threatened action. Id. at 151-52 & n.5. Nor does it require 
proof of "an intent to take action in that general direction." Id. at 151-52. 
As this Court recognized in Fixel, 945 P.2d at 152 n.5, section 76-8-316(1) is "nearly 
identicafto 18U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B), and, consequently, cases interpreting section 115 and 
other similarly-worded statutes provide appropriate guidance. The federal statute reads: 
Whoever threatens to assault, kidnap, murder . . . a United States judge . . . 
with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such... judge.. . while 
engaged in the performance of official duties, or with the intent to retaliate 
against such . . . judge . . . on account of the performance of official duties, 
shall be punished. 
See Add. A for complete text of section 115. Universally, federal courts recognize that an 
objective standard governs what constitutes a threat to assault, kidnap, or murder a judge: 
Alleged threats should be considered in light of their entire factual context, 
including the surrounding events and reaction of the listeners... . Whether a 
particular statement may properly be considered to be a threat is governed by 
an objective standard—whether a reasonable person would foresee that the 
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statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the 
statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault. 
Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265. See also United States v. Saunders, 166 F.3d 907,912 
& 914 n.5 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing First, Second, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits as 
applying objective test). Some federal courts describe the objective standard slightly 
differently: Whether a "reasonable recipient," familiar with the contents and context of the 
communication would interpret the statement as a threat. See United States v. Roberts, 915 
F.2d 889, 891 (4th Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1122 (1991); United States v. Raymer, 
876F.2d383,391 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 870(1989). See also Sanders, 166F.3d 
at 913 n.6 (recognizing two objective tests applied by circuits). But there appears to be little 
qualitative difference between the two standards. Compare Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 
1265, with Roberts, 915 F.2d at 890-91 (both recognizing issue is a jury question determined 
by the totality of the factual circumstances, including the context of the statement, its 
specificity, the manner in which the threat was made, and the reaction of the listener). 
Accord Fixel, 945 P.2d at 152 n.5 (citing with approval objective standards in both Roberts 
and Orozco-Santillan). See also State v. Spainhower, 1999 UT App 280, \ 12,988 P.2d 452 
(in context of different statute, recognizing that objective standard applies in determining 
what constitutes a threat). 
By requiring the threat to be a "true threat," an objectively credible threat, statutes like 
sections 76-8-316(1) and 115(a)(1)(B) ensure that they do not punish protected speech under 
the First Amendment. See Roberts, 915 F.2d at 890 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 
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705, 708 (1969)). Statements that objectively constitute political protest or hyperbole or 
mere jokes do not fall within the statutes' purview. See Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265-
66\ Roberts, 9\5¥2&dLt%90. 
Nevertheless, as recognized in Fixel and other cases, more is required for conviction 
than a general intent to threaten to injure a judge. The defendant must also communicate the 
threat to someone. See United States v. Hinkson, 349 F. Supp.2d 1350, 1355 (D. Idaho 
2004). Whether communication of a threat has occurred normally arises in the context of the 
second element, whether a "true threat" was made. See, e.g.9 Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 
1265; Roberts, 915 F.2d at 891. Universally, courts recognize that an un-communicated 
threat to injure a judge is not criminally punishable because it is nothing more than an 
unexpressed and presumptively un-acted upon thought. See 31A Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, 
Blackmail, and Threats § 54 (May 2006). 
On the other hand, as defendant conceded below (R253: 7), section 76-8-316(1) and 
similarly-worded statutes do not require that a threat to injure a judge actually be 
communicated to the judge. See United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007, 1015-16 (9th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Martin, 163 F.3d 1212, 1216 (10th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 526 U.S. 
U31 (\999)\Raymer,%16¥2&zX?>9\\D'Amariov. United States, 403 F.Supp.2d 361,318 
(D. N.J. 2005) (all recognizing that section 115(a)(1)(B) does not require that a threat to 
injure a judge be actually communicated to the judge). 
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Instead, it is well-recognized that a threat to injure a judge or other designated official 
communicated to any third-party is sufficient to violate section 115(a)( 1 )(B) and statutes like 
section 76-8-316(1). See Martin, 163 F.3d at 1213 & 1216 (affirming a section 115 
conviction where the threat to kill an officer was made to a friend, who, unbeknownst to 
Martin, was a police informant); Roberts, 915 F.2d at 890-91 (affirming a section 115 
conviction based on letter sent to Justice O'Connor threatening to kill Justices Brennan, 
Stevens, and Kennedy); D'Amario, 403 F. Supp.2d at 366 (refusing to vacate a section 115 
conviction based on D'Amario's letter to his attorney threatening to murder judges once he 
was released from prison); Austad v. South Dakota Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 719 N.W.2d 
760, 763 & 765 (S.D. 2006) (concluding that threats to kill a probation officer made to 
Austad's mental health worker were "true threats" and punishable); State v. McCarthy, 101 
P.3d 288,292 & 299 (Mont. 2004) (affirming a state intimidation conviction where the threat 
to kill the district attorney was made in a telephone call between McCarthy and his probation 
officer); State v. Thompson, 580 S.E.2d 9,638 & 644-46 (N.C. App. 2003) (affirming a state 
communication of threats conviction where a threat to kill police officers and others was 
made by Thompson to an acquaintance on a beach); State v. Warsop, 954 P.2d 748, 684-85 
(N.M. App.) (affirming a state retaliation against a witness conviction where the threat to kill 
a rape victim was made by Warsop to a prison correctional officer), cert, denied, 124 N.M. 
589 (N.M. 1998); State v. Jones, 642 So.2d 804, 805 (Fla. App. 1994) (reversing the 
dismissal of information charging retaliation against a witness because prima facie evidence 
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established that Jones told his probation that he intended to kill police officers); State v. 
Hansen, 862P.2d 117,714-15 716-17 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (affirming a state intimidating 
a judge conviction where the threat against a judge was made to an attorney whom Hansen 
was trying to retain). 
The only question here, then, is whether the preliminary hearing evidence is sufficient 
show probable cause that defendant acted with the intent to retaliate. 
B. The Preliminary Hearing Evidence Establishes Probable Cause of the 
Third Element, that Defendant Acted with the Intent to Retaliate 
against Judge Mower on Account of the Judge's Prior Rulings in 
Defendant's Divorce Case. 
Although defendant acknowledges that communication of a threat to a third party is 
sufficient, Br.Aplt. at 8-12, he argues that it is sufficient only if a defendant actually intends 
for the third party to convey the threat to the judge. In other words, defendant contends that 
while he need not communicate his threats to the judge, he must at least intend or foresee that 
the threats may be conveyed to the judge. Defendant explains that this intent is proved if a 
defendant tells the third party to convey the threat to the targeted judge or if the third party 
informs the defendant that he or she will convey the threat to the judge. See Br.Aplt. at 11 
& 15-16. Defendant's argument suffers from two flaws. 
First, it assumes that a threat to retaliate (pay back) a judge has no meaning unless 
the judge learns of the threat. See Br.Aplt. at 11. Consequently, defendant argues that the 
plain language of section 76-8-316(1) requires proof that he intended the judge to learn of 
the threat, even if the judge does not actually learn of it. See Br.Aplt. at 9-12. 
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Second, it incorrectly assumes that "with the intent to retaliate" modifies only "threat" 
and not the threatened action of assault, kidnap, or murder. In other words, according to 
defendant, the threat alone must be intended as retaliation for some past action. In some 
cases, such as when the threat is a mere bluff, this may be true. See Fixel, 945 P.2d at 152 
(recognizing that a defendant may simply wish to pay back a judge by upsetting him, as 
opposed to causing him real harm). It is not true, however, when the threat to injure is real. 
When a defendant threatens to actually injure a judge, the phrase "with the intent to retaliate" 
necessarily also modifies the intended action—assault, kidnap, or murder. In such 
circumstances, the injury itself is intended as retaliation for some past action of the judge, 
not merely the threat. 
The purposes underlying threat statutes support this reading of section 76-8-316(1). 
Those well-recognized purposes include: preventing actual injury to an individual judge; 
minimizing inconvenience to and disruption of government function caused by threats, 
whether real or bluff; guaranteeing that judicial decisions are made without fear of reprisal 
or adverse consequence; and demanding respect for the judiciary even when a party or the 
public disagree with a decision. See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 47-48 (1975) 
(Marshall, J., concurring) (in context of threats against the president); United States v. 
Fuller, 387 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Richards, 415 F. Supp.2d 547, 
553-54 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (same). Therefore, the plain language of section 76-8-316(1), read 
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in light of these purposes, necessarily requires that "with the intent to retaliate" modify both 
the threat and the threatened act. 
Moreover, the overwhelming majority of cases to interpret this language reject 
defendant's assertion that he must intend for the threat to reach the judge. See cases, supra, 
at 18-19. This is because, as previously discussed, sections 78-8-316(1) and 115(a)(1)(B) 
proscribe only "true threats," i.e., credible threats to harm, whether real or bluff. Because 
the determination of what constitutes a "true threat" requires placing a threat in context, the 
majority of courts view "with the intent to retaliate" as explaining the motive for the threat 
or threatened action. See supra at 16-17. 
Under this general intent/motivation approach, affirmative defenses such as mental 
illness or intoxication are deemed irrelevant. A small number of courts disagree that such 
defenses should be excluded. These courts view "with intent to retaliate" as a specific intent 
and, thereby, permit introduction of any evidence disproving that intent. See, e.g., United 
States v. Veach, 455 F.3d 628,632 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing specific intent); United States 
v. Stewart, 420 F.3d at 1017-19 (recognizing and applying both general intent and specific 
intent approaches). Fixe/may follow this specific intent approach. 945 P.2d at 151 (noting, 
"It is not enough that a threat is uttered. It has to be uttered with a specified intent."). But 
whether "intent to retaliate" is a description of motivation or a specific intent, proof of it may 
still be established by reasonable inferences drawn from both the content and the context of 
a threat. See Stewart, 420 F.3d at 1017-19. Cf. Fixel, 945P.2dat 152. Accordingly, when 
22 
as here, the threat to assault or murder is expressly conditioned upon an intent to retaliate, 
specific intent is established. 
Aside from Fixel, defendant cites but one case to support his argument that evidence 
must establish his intent to communicate the threat to the judge. See BrAplt at 11 (citing 
United States v. Fenton, 30 F. Supp.2d 520 (W.D. Pa. 1998)). Defendant's reliance on 
Fenton is misplaced. In any case, it stands nearly alone. 
In Fenton, the district court held that a threat to kill a senator made to an insurance 
adjuster did not violate section 115(a)(1)(B). 30 F. Supp.2d at 522-24. The district judge 
based his decision on two grounds: (1) Fenton's statement was not objectively threatening, 
and (2) the threat was not a "true threat" because there was no connection between the 
insurance adjuster and the senator. Id. at 523-25 & n.5 (citing United States v. Bellrichard, 
779 F.2d454 (D. Minn. 1991), aff'd994 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 510 U.S. 928 
(1993)). Bellrichard, however, only requires that a foreseeable, not actual, connection exits. 
779 F.2d at 460. Fenton's approach is contrary to the majority view and inconsistent with 
the purposes of threat statutes. SeeHinkson, 349 F. Supp.2d at 1355-57. But even ifFenton 
were applied here, the evidence supports that a foreseeable connection exists: Jelte was an 
officer of the court and was appearing before Judge Mower in defendant's divorce case. 
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In sum, defendant's argument that the preliminary hearing evidence was insufficient 
is neither legally or factually supportable.7 Accordingly, defendant's motion to quash the 
bindover was properly denied. See State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, | 15, 26 P.3d 223 
(recognizing that evidence is sufficient to support a bindover when is establishes "a 
reasonable belief that defendant engaged in the charged conduct) (citation and quotation 
marks omitted) (emphasis in original). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS TO JELTE THAT HE INTENDED TO 
KILL TWO JUDGES AND OPPOSING COUNSEL ARE NOT 
PRIVILEGED; IN ANY CASE, DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY CLAIM 
OF PRIVILEGE WHEN HE STIPULATED TO THE ADMISSION OF 
THE STATEMENTS IN PRELIMINARY HEARING 
At preliminary hearing, defendant stipulated to the admission of Exhibit 1, Jelte's 
written summary of threats he made in his conversations with her in June and September, 
2005 (R252: 9-12). He also stipulated to the admission of Exhibit 2, the tape recording of 
the September 16 conversation between defendant and Jelte (id.). At the preliminary 
hearing, he did not assert that either exhibit contained inadmissible privileged information. 
Nor did he otherwise claim that the preliminary hearing magistrate could not fully consider 
7A comparison of the State's Statement of Facts, supra at 6-11, and defendant's 
factual summary and assertions, Br.Aplt at 4-5 & 12-15, demonstrates that defendant has 
failed to properly marshaled the facts. Though he recites the threats made, he does not 
place them in context nor acknowledge all of the surrounding circumstances. This Court 
may, therefore, summarily refuse to consider the merits of his claim. See United Park 
City v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ffif 25-27, 140 P.3d 1200. 
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the information contained in the exhibits. To the contrary, he encouraged the magistrate to 
review both exhibits before ruling on defendant's motions to dismiss Count I and for change 
of venue (R252: 12-13). 
Subsequently, defendant disclosed the contents of his conversations with his attorney 
when he moved to quash the bindover order and extensively quoted from Exhibit 2 in his 
memorandum (R. 120-34). When he did, he did not assert that the information was 
privileged or otherwise attempt to minimize its disclosure (id). Moreover, at various points 
in the proceedings below, he agreed that he had stipulated to the disclosure of the information 
contained in Exhibits 1 and 2 (R. 36, 120-24; R253: 24). 
Despite these prior voluntary disclosures, defendant eventually moved for an in limine 
ruling "preventing the [S]tate from admitting into evidence [at trial] any privileged 
statements Defendant is alleged to have made to his Attorney, Joy Jelte" (R. 147). 
Defendant argued that any statements he made to Jelte, including his threats to assault or 
murder Judges Mower and Lyman and attorney Neeley, fell within the attorney-client 
privilege rule and were barred from admission at trial (R. 147-50, 218-22). See Utah R. 
Evid. 504 (attorney-client privilege rule) (Add. A). This included Exhibits 1 and 2 and any 
testimony from Jelte concerning those conversations (id.). See also R253: 20-22. 
The prosecutor responded that the threats did not fall within the privilege rule, which 
protected only "confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the 
rendition of professional legal services" (R. 178-82). See Utah. R. Evid. 504(b). The 
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prosecutor argued that the threats were not confidential because defendant disclosed the same 
information to a third party (id.). See Utah R, Evid. 504(a)(6). Nor were the threats made 
to obtain legal advice (id.). See also R253: 22. 
The trial court correctly found no privilege because the threats were not 
communicated to Jelte to obtain legal advice (R. 224-27) (Add. E)} This Court should 
likewise conclude no privilege exists. Alternatively, this Court may affirm on the ground that 
whether privilege exists or not, defendant waived his right to assert the privilege at trial when 
he consented to the disclosure of the statements at preliminary hearing. 
A. Defendant's Threats Made to His Attorney Are Not Privileged 
Because the Statements Were Not Confidential and Not Made to 
Obtain Legal Advice. 
An attorney, as an officer of the court and to prevent harm to another, may ethically 
disclose a client's threat to assault or murder a judge or opposing counsel. See Utah R. Prof. 
Conduct, Preamble (attorney's pledge to act as an officer of the courts) & Rule 1.6(b) 
(recognizing that a lawyer has the discretion to breach confidentiality to prevent "reasonably 
certain death or substantial bodily harm") (Add. A). Here, Jelte's disclosure to the police of 
defendant's threats was ethically appropriate (R. 224).9 
8The trial court did not address confidentiality (R. 224-27). 
9In a footnote, defendant asserts that Jelte's disclosure was not ethically 
permissible because defendant told her that he did not "have anything planned for the 
near future." See BrAplt. at 18-19 n.5 & R254: 24. Defendant's actions at the Monday 
hearing indicate otherwise. At the hearing, defendant appeared agitated, confronted 
attorney Neeley, demanded that Neeley pay him $150,000 (as defendant told Jelte he 
would on Friday), and after Neeley refused, defendant told Jelte, "that asshole is going to 
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Nevertheless, while an attorney may ethically disclose confidential information to 
prevent physical harm, the disclosed information may nevertheless be barred pursuant to 
evidentiary rule. See Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, f 15 n.4,133 P.3d 370 (noting without 
deciding that obligatory reporting statutes "may not constitute complete exceptions to the 
privilege rules," which may bar testimony, citing Edward L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, 
Utah Evidence Law, at 5-159 n.89 (2d ed. 2004)). 
Utah's attorney-client privilege is found in rule 504(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, 
which states: "A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person 
from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the 
rendition of professional legal services." See Add. A for complete text. The rule defines a 
communication as "confidential if not intended to be disclosed to third persons." See Utah 
R. Evid. 504(a)(6) {Add. A). As the rule makes clear, "the mere existence of an attorney-
client relationship 'does not ipso facto make all communications between them 
confidential.'" GoldStandardy Inc. v. American BarrickResources Corp., 801 P.2d 909, 
911 (Utah 1990). Rather, the privilege "protects only those disclosures—necessary to obtain 
informed legal advice—which might not have been made absent the privilege." Id. (citation 
and quotation marks omitted). By promoting "full and frank communication between 
die and all of his family" (R. 5) {Add. B). These actions reasonably increased the 
probability that defendant intended to actually harm Neeley and, in turn, the judges. 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the ethical rules do not require that the threat of harm 
be imminent; instead, the standard is reasonableness. See Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.0 & 
\.6{b) {Add A). 
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attorneys and their clients," the privilege promotes "broader public interests in the 
observance of law and administration of justice." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 
383, 389 (1981). Moreover, "[s]ince the privilege has the effect of withholding relevant 
information from the fact-finder, it applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose." 
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
The party asserting privilege has the burden to show the communication qualifies for 
protection under rule 504. See Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 495 P.2d 1254, 1257 
(Utah 1972). Though privilege is a legal determination, it is highly fact-dependent and best 
determined on an individual basis. Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74, \ 6, 984 P.2d 980; Gold 
Standard, Inc., 801 P.2d at 911. Because the trial court found no privilege existed here, 
defendant is obligated to marshal the facts and show why the trial court decision is wrong. 
United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35, \ 26. Defendant has not met his marshaling 
burden. 
Instead, defendant merely summarizes the facts to support his assertion that the threats 
he communicated to Jelte are protected by the privilege. See Br.Aplt at 22-24. Defendant 
claims that the threats were "made intermittently in the course of a protracted discussion of 
his protracted divorce." Br.Aplt. at 23. He claims that in the September 16 conversation, the 
two legitimately discussed defendant's "child support and visitation, the property division, 
the protective order, whether he would exercise his right to appeal, whether he could afford 
to pay attorney fees for an appeal, potential reconciliation with his wife, the proper attorney's 
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fees for her lawyer, whether the lawyers and judges in his case were following the law, 
whether there was perjury, ex parte contact with a judge or unethical conduct involved in the 
case, how justice should be administered, and what the potential consequences were to him 
if he hurt someone." Br.Aplt at 23-24. Exhibit 2 negates these claims: there was no 
legitimate discussion of these issues, but for Jelte's initial statements that she could not 
discuss the divorce issues because she was not "up to speed" and would call defendant on 
Sunday (R254:2 & 4; R253:15,17). After this, the remainder of the conversation consisted 
of defendant's tirades against the judges, opposing counsel, his wife, and the judicial system 
(R254: 5-24) (Add. Q. These tirades were not simply "heated frustration" as characterized 
by defendant, Br.Aplt. at 24, but explicit threats to assault or murder two judges, opposing 
counsel, and their families. See Statement of Facts, supra. See also Add. C. 
Additionally, defendant improperly claims that Jelte "wished" defendant to repeat the 
threats she had previously heard on June 27 and September 13 and wanted "to set up 
[defendant] to make inflammatory statements on the tape." Br.Aplt. at 22-23. Again, review 
of Exhibit 2 and Jelte's hearing testimony (R253: 15) negates defendant's claims. 
When the conversations related in Exhibits 1 and 2 are considered in context and their 
content properly marshaled, it is clear that no privilege applies. The marshaled facts establish 
that defendant did not discuss his plans to assault or kill the judges and attorney Neeley only 
with his attorney. He told Jelte that he had already disclosed the same information to a third-
party, "his buddy," who agreed with defendant that he would probably not get caught if he 
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assaulted or killed the targeted individuals, but that defendant would "go to hell" (R254:13-
15). Consequently, the information was never confidential nor intended to be. See Utah R. 
Evid. 504(6). 
Additionally, when the facts are properly marshaled, they establish that defendant was 
not seeking legal advice when he made the threats to Jelte. The divorce action was 
completed when the threats began in June (R. 4; R253: 14). In September, only entry of 
formal factual findings and a decree were pending (R253: 16). The threats to kill opposing 
counsel and the judges certainly arose from the divorce case, but they had no legitimate 
relevancy to the proceedings or Jelte's services. To the contrary, Jelte, both as a friend and 
attorney, tried to stop defendant from making the threats. She warned him that if he was 
caught, he would be jailed; but he said he did not care. See Statement of Facts, supra. She 
told him he needed psychological counseling; but he refused. See id. When she sought the 
name of the friend he had spoken to and more details of defendant's plans, defendant refused 
and told her that "[i]t won't benefit you, and I know it won't benefit me if I tell you" (R254: 
15) (Add. C). In sum, even defendant did not pretend during the conversation that he was 
seeking professional legal advice or services. He was, instead, simply telling his attorney of 
his intention to commit a future crime. Such statements are not privileged. See United 
States v. Alexander, 287 F.3d 811, 815 & 817 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that Alexander's 
threats to his attorneys to kill them, opposing counsel, and federal agents were not privileged 
because the threats were not made to obtain legal advice and the attorneys could testify as 
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witnesses to the threats); Aviles v. State, 165 S.W.3d 437, 339 (Texas App. 2005) (holding 
that Aviles' threat to kill the prosecutor, which was heard by the translator appointed to assist 
defense counsel, was not privileged because it was not made to facilitate the obtaining of 
legal services); Hodgson Russ, LLP, v. Trube, 867 So.2d 1246, 1247 (Fla. App. 2004) 
(holding that client's threat to kill his sister to end their legal dispute, which was made to his 
attorney, was not privileged because it was not made to obtain legal advice). See also 
Hansen, 862 P.2d at 121 (finding no attorney-client relationship, but recognizing that if such 
a relationship existed, it would not protect "a client's remarks concerning the furtherance of 
crime, fraud, or to conversations regarding the contemplation of a future crime"). But see 
Purcell v. District Attorney, 676 N.E.2d 436, 440-42 (Mass. 1997) (holding that a client's 
statements to his attorney that he intended to burn down an apartment building were 
privileged).10 
Based on defendant's failure to properly marshal the evidence, this Court should 
summarily reject the merits of his claim. Even if the merits are considered, defendant has 
failed to establish that his statements to Jelte were confidential or were made to facilitate the 
obtaining of professional legal advice. Consequently, the trial court's refusal to exclude the 
statements from trial should be affirmed. 
10Neither the State nor these cases rely on the crime-fraud exception of the 
attorney-client privilege because that exception applies only when the client seeks to 
obtain his attorney's help in committing a crime. See Utah R. Evid. 504(d)(1) {Add. A). 
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B. Alternatively, Defendant Waived Any Claim of Privilege. 
"'It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if 
it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such 
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or 
action.'" Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, \ 8, 94 P.3d 263 (quoting Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 
UT 58, f 10, 52 P.3d 1158) (other citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, the Court 
may affirm on the alternative ground of waiver. See Doe, 1999 UT 74, ^ f 5 (reaching waiver 
as an alternative ground to affirm). 
Because the trial court ruled that the statements to Jelte were not privileged, it did not 
consider whether any privilege was waived (R. 224-27) {Add. E). However, the facts 
necessary to determine waiver are evident on the record and factually undisputed. 
Consequently, whether or not privilege exists, this Court may dispose of defendant's claim 
on the alternative ground that he waived his right to claim privilege at trial when he 
stipulated to the admission of Exhibits 1 and 2 in preliminary hearing. 
Here, it is undisputed that defendant stipulated to the admission of Exhibits 1 and 2 
in preliminary hearing (R. 36, 120-24; R252: 9-12; R253: 24). Exhibit 1 discloses the 
substance of conversations between defendant and Jelte on June 27 and September 13, 16, 
and 19. See Statement of Facts, supra. Exhibit 2 is a tape-recording of the September 16 
conversation (R252:10-13). While it is true that Jelte, if called to testify at trial, might reveal 
additional details of the unrecorded conversations, significant portions of the June 27 and 
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September 13 and 19 conversations have already been disclosed. Moreover, the tape-
recording of the September 16 conversation fully reveals that conversation, including 
defendant's tone and expression, but for possibly some minimal discussion towards the end 
of the conversation when the tape ran out (R254: 24). In sum, the information defendant 
now claims is privileged for purposes of trial has already been significantly, if not fully, 
disclosed at the preliminary hearing. 
Because defendant stipulated to these prior disclosures, he has waived his right to 
claim that the disclosed information is privileged. Rule 507 (a), Utah Rules of Evidence, 
directs that an evidentiary privilege is waived when the holder of the privilege "voluntarily 
discloses or consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the matter of 
communication." See Add. A. The Advisory Committee Note recognizes: "Since the 
purpose of evidentiary privileges is the protection of some societal interest or confidential 
relationship, the privilege should end when the purpose is no longer served because the 
holder of the privilege has allowed disclosure or made disclosure." See Utah R. Evid. 
507(a), Advisory Committee Note (Add. A). See also Doe, 1999 UT 74, ^ 3 (recognizing 
that privilege is waived when voluntary disclosure of the information occurs in a prior 
deposition); State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah App. 1998) (holding that Anderson 
waived any claim of privilege at trial when he failed to object to the testimony at preliminary 
hearing). 
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Anderson involved nearly identical facts and controls the outcome here. Anderson 
was charged with fraudulently obtaining controlled substances by prescription. Anderson, 
972 P.2d at 87. At preliminary hearing, the prosecution called Anderson's doctors to testify. 
Id. Anderson did not assert that the doctors' testimonies or their records were inadmissible 
on grounds of physician-patient privilege. Id. Before trial, Anderson filed a motion in 
limine to exclude the doctors' testimonies and records from trial on the ground of privilege. 
Id. This Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that no privilege existed because Anderson 
had not communicated confidentially with the doctors to obtain a legitimate diagnosis or 
treatment. Id. at 89. Alternatively, it reversed the trial court's ruling that Anderson's failure 
to assert the privilege at preliminary did not waive the privilege for trial. Id. Instead, this 
Court held that "when [Anderson] failed to assert the physician-patient privilege to prevent 
disclosure at preliminary hearing, he waived the privilege and could not thereafter reassert 
it at trial." Id. at 90. The same holds true for defendant here. 
In sum, defendant's threats were not privileged. This Court, however, need not 
resolve the issue because, whether privileged or not, defendant waived his right to assert 
privilege. Exhibits 1 and 2 and testimony from Joy Jelte, therefore, are not barred from trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's denials of 
defendant's motion to quash the bindover and motion in limine to exclude evidence. The 
case should be remanded to the district court to proceed to trial. 
Respectfully submitted this / 9 ^ d a y of March, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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UT ST § 76-8-316 
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-316 
t> 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
*i Chapter 8. Offenses Against The Administration of Government 
*I Part 3. Obstructing Governmental Operations 
-•§ 76-8-316. Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a judge or member 
of the Board of Pardons and Parole 
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if the person threatens to 
assault, kidnap, or murder a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole 
with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the judge or member of 
the board while engaged in the performance of the judge's or member's official 
duties or with the intent to retaliate against the judge or member on account of 
the performance of those official duties. 
(2) A person is guilty of a second degree felony if the person commits an assault 
on a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole with the intent to 
impede, intimidate, or interfere with the judge or member of the board while 
engaged in the performance of the judge's or member's official duties, or with the 
intent to retaliate against the judge or member on account of the performance of 
those official duties. 
(3) A person is guilty of a first degree felony if the person commits aggravated 
assault or attempted murder on a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons and 
Parole with the purpose to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the judge or 
member of the board while engaged in the performance of the judge's or member's 
official duties or with the purpose to retaliate against the judge or member on 
account of the performance of those official duties. 
(4) As used in this section: 
(a) "Immediate family" means parents, spouse, surviving spouse, children, and 
siblings of the officer. 
(b) "Judge" means judges of all courts of record and courts not of record. 
(c) "Judge or member" includes the members of the judge's or member's immediate 
family. 
(d) "Member of the Board of Pardons and Parole" means appointed members of the 
board. 
(5) A member of the Board of Pardons and Parole is an executive officer for 
purposes of Subsection 76-5-202(1) (k) . 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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18U.S.C.A. § 115 
C 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 18. Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
*£i Part I. Crimes (Refs & Annos) 
*i Chapter 7. Assault 
-»§ 115. Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a 
family member 
(a)(1) Whoever--:•••'• . 
(A) assaults, kidnaps, or murders, or attempts or conspires to kidnap or murder, or threatens to assault, kidnap or 
murder a member of the immediate family of a United States official, a United States judge, a Federal law 
enforcement officer, or an official whose killing would be a crime under section 1114 of this title; or 
(B) threatens to assault, kidnap, or murder, a United States official, a United States judge, a Federal law 
enforcement officer, or an official whose killing would be a crime under such section, 
with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such official, judge, or law enforcement officer while engaged in 
the performance of official duties, or with intent to retaliate against such official, judge, or law enforcement officer 
on account of the performance of official duties, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). 
(2) Whoever assaults, kidnaps, or murders, or attempts or conspires to kidnap or murder, or threatens to assault, 
kidnap, or murder, any person who formerly served as a person designated in paragraph (1), or a member of the 
immediate family of any person who formerly served as a person designated in paragraph (1), with intent to 
retaliate against such person on account of the performance of official duties during the term of service of such 
person, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). 
(b)(1) An assault in violation of this section shall be punished as provided in section 111 of this title. 
(2) A kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, or conspiracy to kidnap in violation of this section shall be punished as 
provided in section 1201 of this title for the kidnapping or attempted kidnapping of, or a conspiracy to kidnap, a 
person described in section 1201(a)(5) of this title. 
(3) A murder, attempted murder, or conspiracy to murder in violation of this section shall be punished as provided 
in sections 1111, 1113, and 1117 of this title. 
(4) A threat made in violation of this section shall be punished by a fine under this title or imprisonment for a term 
of not more than 10 years, or both, except that imprisonment for a threatened assault shall not exceed 6 years. 
(c) As used in this section, the term— 
(1) "Federal law enforcement officer" means any officer, agent, or employee of the United States authorized by 
law or by a Government agency to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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of any violation of Federal criminal law; 
(2) "immediate family member" of an individual means— 
(A) his spouse, parent, brother or sister, child or person to whom he stands in loco parentis; or 
(B) any other person living in his household and related to him by blood or marriage; 
(3) "United States judge" means any judicial officer of the United States, and includes a justice of the Supreme 
Court and a United States magistrate judge; and 
(4) "United States official" means the President, President-elect, Vice President, Vice President-elect, a Member 
of Congress, a member-elect of Congress, a member of the executive branch who is the head of a depaitment 
listed in 5 U.S.C. 101, or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. 
(d) This section shall not interfere with the investigative authority of the United States Secret Service, as provided 
under sections 3056, 871, and 879 of this title. 
yw&em 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 504 
C 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos) 
*I Article V. Privileges 
-•RULE 504. LAWYER-CLIENT 
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule: 
(1) A "client" is a person, including a public officer, or corporation, association, or other organization or entity, 
either public or private, who is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a 
view to obtaining professional legal services. 
(2) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized, to practice law in 
any state or nation. 
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to assist the lawyer in a rendition of professional legal 
services. 
(4) A "representative of the client" is one having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on 
advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized to communicate with the 
lawyer concerning a legal matter. 
(5) A "communication" includes advice given by the lawyer in the course of representing the client and includes 
disclosures of the client and the client's representatives to the lawyer or the lawyer's representative incidental to 
the professional relationship. 
(6) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom 
disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably 
necessary for the transmission of the communication. 
(b) General Rule of Privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from 
disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal 
services to the client between the client and the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and 
lawyers representing others in matters of common interest, and among the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's 
representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common interest, in any combination. 
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the client, the client's guardian or 
conservator, the personal representative of a deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative of a 
corporation, association, or other organization, whether or not in existence. The person who was the lawyer at the 
time of the communication is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege on behalf of the client. 
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule: 
(1) Furtherance of Crime or Fraud. If the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid 
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anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or 
fraud; or 
(2) Claimants Through Same Deceased Client. As to a communication relevant to an issue between parties who 
claim through the same deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or 
by inter vivos transaction; or 
(3) Breach of Duty by Lawyer or Client. As to a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the 
lawyer to the client or by the client to the lawyer; or 
(4) Document Attested by Lawyer. As to a communication relevant to an issue concerning a document to which 
the lawyer is an attesting witness; or 
(5) Joint Clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common interest between two or more clients if 
the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an 
action between any of the clients. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
Rule 504 is based upon proposed Rule 503 of the United States Supreme Court. Rule 504 would replace and 
supersede Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(2) and is intended to be consistent with the ethical obligations of 
confidentiality set forth in Rule 1.6 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The Committee revised the proposed rule of the United States Supreme Court to address the issues raised in 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677 (1981), as to when communications involving 
representatives of a corporation are protected by the privilege. The Committee rejected limiting the privilege to 
members of the "control group" and added as subparagraph (a)(4) a definition for "representative of the client" that 
includes within the privilege disclosures not only of the client and the client's formal spokesperson, but also 
employees who are specifically authorized to communicate to the lawyer concerning a legal matter. The word 
"specifically" is intended to preclude a general authorization from the client for the client's employees to 
communicate under the cloak of the privilege, but is intended to allow the client, as related to a specific matter, to 
authorize the client's employees as "representatives" to disclose information to the lawyer as to that specific matter 
with confidence that the disclosures will remain within the lawyer-client privilege. 
A "representative" of the lawyer need not be directly paid by the lawyer as long as the representative meets the 
requirement of being engaged to assist the lawyer in providing legal services. Thus, a person paid directly by the 
client but working under the control and direction of the lawyer for the purposes of providing legal services 
satisfies the requirements of subparagraph (a)(3). Similarly, a representative of the client who may be an 
independent contractor, such as an independent accountant, consultant or person providing other services, is a 
representative of the client for purposes of subparagraph (a)(5) if such person has been engaged to provide services 
reasonably related to the subject matter of the legal services or whose service is necessary to provide such service. 
The client is entitled not only to refuse to disclose the confidential communication, but also to prevent disclosure 
by the lawyer or others who were involved in the conference or learned, without the knowledge of the client, the 
content of the confidential communication. Problems of waiver are dealt with by Rule 507. 
Under subparagraph (b) communications among the various people involved in the legal matter, relating to the 
providing of legal services, are all privileged, except for communications between clients. Those are privileged 
only if they are part of a conference with others involved in legal services. 
Subparagraph (c) allows the "successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, association, or other 
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organization, whether or not in existence" to claim the privilege. Where there is a dispute as to which of several 
persons has claims to the rights of a previously existing entity, the court will be required to determine from the 
facts which entity's claim is most consistent with the purposes of this rule. 
The Committee considered and rejected an exception to the rule for communications in furtherance of a tort. 
Disallowing the privilege where the lawyer's services are sought in furtherance of a crime or fraud is consistent 
with the trend in other states. The Committee considered extending the exception to include "intentional torts," but 
concluded that because of the broad range of conduct that may be found to be an intentional tort, such an exception 
would create undesirable ambiguities and uncertainties as to when the privilege applies. 
The Committee felt that exceptions to the privilege should be specifically enumerated, and further endorsed the 
concept that in the area of exceptions, the rule should simply state that no privilege existed, rather than expressing 
the exception in terms of a "waiver" of the privilege. The Committee wanted to avoid any possible clashes with the 
common law concepts of "waiver." 
\fetlaw 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 507 
C 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos) 
*i Article V. Privileges 
-•RULE 507. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS 
(a) A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of the confidential matter or 
communication waives the privilege if the person or a predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily 
discloses or consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication, or fails to take 
reasonable precautions against inadvertent disclosure. This rule does not apply if the disclosure is itself a 
privileged communication. 
(b) Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of privileged matter is not admissible against the holder of the 
privilege if disclosure was 
(1) compelled erroneously or 
(2) made without opportunity to claim the privilege. 
(c)(1) Comment or Inference Not Permitted. The claim of privilege, whether in the present proceeding or upon a 
prior occasion, is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel. No inference may be drawn therefrom. 
(2) Claiming Privilege Without Knowledge of Jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent 
practicable, so as to facilitate the making of claims of privilege without the knowledge of the jury. 
(3) Juiy Instruction. Upon request, any party against whom the jury might draw an adverse inference from the 
claim of privilege is entitled to instruction that no inference may be drawn therefrom. 
(4) Exception. In a civil action, the provisions of subparagraph (c) do not apply when the privilege against 
self-incrimination has been invoked. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
The subject matter of Rule 507 was previously included in Utah Rules of Evidence 37, 38, 39 and 40. The 
language recommended by the Committee, however, is largely that of proposed Federal Rules 511, 512 and 513, 
rules not included among those adopted by Congress. 
Proposed Federal Rule 511 became Rule 507(a), replacing Rule 37. Proposed Federal Rule 512 became Rule 
507(b), replacing Rule 38. Proposed Federal Rule 513 became Rule 507(c), replacing Rule 39. No replacement 
was adopted for Rule 40 since the Committee detemiined that the subject matter of that rule need not be covered by 
a rule of evidence. 
Subparagraph (a). Since the purpose of evidentiary privileges is the protection of some societal interest or 
confidential relationship, the privilege should end when the purpose is no longer served because the holder of the 
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pnvilege has allowed disclosuie 01 made disclosuie Foi the same leascn, although Rule 37 requued a knowing 
waiver of the pnvilege, Rule 507(a) as diafted does not lequire such knowledge A stiangei to the communication 
may testify to an otheiwise privileged communication, if the participants have failed to take leasonable piecautions 
to pieserve pnvacy 
Subparagraph (b). Once disclosuie of pnvileged matter has occurred, although confidentiality cannot be 
restoied, the purpose of the pnvilege may still be served m some instances by pi eventing use of the evidence 
against the holder of the privilege For that reason, pnvileged matter may still be excluded when the disclosure 
was not voluntary or was made without an opportunity to claim the pnvilege 
Subparagraph (c). 
(1) Allowing inferences to be drawn fiom the invocation of a privilege might undermine the mteiest or relationship 
the privilege was designed to protect 
(2) Foi the same reason, the invocation of a pnvilege should not be revealed to the jury Doing so might also result 
in unwarranted emphasis on the exclusion of the pnvileged matter 
(3) Whether to seek an instruction is left to the judgment of counsel for the party against whom the mfeience might 
be drawn If requested, such an instruction is a matter of light 
(4) The provisions of subparagraph (c)(4) are not intended to alter the common law rules as to inferences that may 
be drawn or as to when a party may comment or be entitled to a jury instruction when the pnvilege has been 
invoked 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
RULE 1.0. TERMINOLOGY 
(a) "Belief or "believes" denotes that the person involved actually supposed 
the fact in question to be true. A person's belief may be inferre4 from 
circumstances. 
(b) "Confirmed in writing," when used in reference to the informed consent 
of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person or 
a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral 
informed consent. See paragraph (f) for the definition of "informed consent." 
If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives 
informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reason-
able time thereafter. 
(c) "Consult" or "consultation" denotes communication of information rea^ 
sonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the 
matter in question. 
(d) "Firm" or "law firm" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership, 
professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to 
practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal 
department of a corporation or other organization. 
(e) "Fraud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the 
substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose 
to deceive. 
(f) "Informed consent" denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed 
course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information 
and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alterna-
tives to the proposed course of conduct. 
(g) "Knowingly," "know" or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact 
in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. 
(h) "Partner" denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law 
firm organized as a professional corporation, or a member of an association 
authorized to practice law. 
(i) "Reasonable" or "reasonably" when used in relation to conduct by a 
lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer. 
(j) "Reasonable belief" or "reasonably believes" when used in reference to a 
lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the 
circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable. 
(k) "Reasonably should know" when used in reference to a lawyer denotes 
that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the 
matter in question. 
(/) "Screened" denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a 
matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are 
reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the 
isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these Rules or other law. 
(m) "Substantial" when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a 
material matter of clear and weighty importance. 
(n) "Tribunal" denotes a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration pro-
ceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an 
adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body 
acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of 
evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a binding legal 
judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter. 
(o) "Writing" or "written" denotes a tangible or electronic record of a 
communication or representation, including handwriting, typewriting, printing, 
photostating, photography, audio or videorecording and e-mail. A "signed" 
writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically 
associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent 
to sign the writing. 
[Amended effective November 1, 2005.] 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
R U L E 1,6. CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a 
client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly 
authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permit-
ted by paragraph (b). 
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client 
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(b)(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm; 
(b)(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reason-
ably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interest or property of 
another and in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services; 
(b)(3) to prevent,mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial inter-
ests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted 
from the client's commission of a crime or fraud and in furtherance of which 
the client has used the lawyer's services; 
(b)(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules; 
(b)(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy 
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or 
civil Jiclaim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was 
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the law-
yer's representation of the client; or 
(b)(6) to comply with other law or a court order. 
(c) For purposes of this rule, representation of a client includes counseling a 
lawyer about the need for or availability of treatment for substance abuse or 
psychological or emotional problems by members of the Utah State Bar serving 
on an Utah State Bar endorsed lawyer assistance program. 
[Amended effective November 1, 2005.] 
Addendum B 
mm DISTRICT COURT 
2mSEP20 m 1**20 
R. Don Brown #0464 &LERK—*jQo 
S evi e r—County—At-t orney— 1/~ 
Sevier County Justice Complex 
835 East 300 North, Suite 100 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: (435) 896-2675 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , : 
A F F I D A V I T 
V S . : 
JEFFERY K. JOHNSON, : 
DOB: 09/22/69 Case No. 
Defendant. : Judge 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SEVIER ) 
Deputy Dusty Torgerson, being duly sworn on oath, deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. The undersigned has investigated allegations that the 
Defendant has threatened the lives of two judges who have been 
involved in determining issues in litigation involving the Defendant. 
2. Attached hereto and incorporated herein is a statement 
from the Defendant's attorney detailing threats made. 
3. That the alternation between the Defendant and Doug 
Neeley which is recited in the attorney's statement was observed by 
law enforcement officers and confirms his agitated state. 
Page 2-—Affidavit 
State of Utah vs. Jeffery K. Johnson 
4. The Defendant is believed to be extremely dangerous and 
mentally unstable and is a danger to the community. 
5. An arrest warrant is necessary for the protection of the 
judges, attorneys, and the public. 
DATED this c$cP^ day of September, 2005. 
C__D©8T£ T0£GERIC ON 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thi 
September, 2005. 
! • < & * * 
i 
BELINDA CARTER 
Notary Public 1 




NOTARY PUBLIC J /}
 x 
Residing at ^$//4<A, 
My Commission Expires 0l/E) /DK 
Officer Dusty Torgerson 
Sevier County Sheriff 
835 East 300 North, Suite 200 
Richfield, Utafr84701 
M.JOYJELTE 
Attorney at Law 
140 West 9000 South, Suite 10 
Sandy, Utah 84070-2033 
Telephone 801-567-1855 
Facsimile 801-567-1886 
September 20, 2005 
Dear Mr. Torgerson: 
Re: Jeffery K. Johnson 
Please find enclosed my witness statement I will be mailing to you the taped telephone 
from September 16, 2005. 
Sincerely, 
M. Joy Jelte 
Attorney at Law 
September 20, 2005 
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On June 27. 2005, Jeff Johnson told me that the problem, as he saw his situation and 
specifically attorney Doug Neeley, was in 'leaving him alive/' 
On September 13, 2005, Jeff Johnson called me from (505) 598-4058 at 1:57 p.m. and told 
me the following: 
1. "His life will end," (Jeff was referring at that time to Doug Neeley.) 
2. Jeff intends to "work outside the law. I don't really care [what happens], 
there will be justice.55 
.3. Jeff stated that Judge Lyman was "right up there with them." He was 
referring to Judge Mower, attorney Doug Neeley and attorney Dale Eyre. 
4. Jeff stated that he had "given up on the legal system" and Tasked him what he 
meant. He stated that it meant, "what 1 decide" and that it would mean a loss 
of home, family and job, 
5. Jeff stated that he was intending to take the opportunity to take Doug Neeley 
down. 
6. I asked Jeff to consider the impact of his actions on his children and his 
parents. His response was that his parents would soon be dead; that he would 
wait until they were gone; and that his actions would not impact their lives. 
He stated that he had already lost his children in that he did not intend to ever 
see them again. 
7. I asked Jeff if he was planning to kill, shoot or bomb someone and his 
response was, "I'm not saying." 
8. He stated that he did not care about prison. 
On September 16, 2005, I telephoned Jeff Johnson from my office and Jeff told me the 
following: 
1. Jeff stated that Judge Mower was "going to have what's coming to him." 
2. Jeff stated that he does not have any faith in the legal system and that he'd 
take care of it himself. 
3. Jeff said two or three times that, "after the first one, the rest are free," 
4. Jeff stated that they could put him in jail or take his guns, but that it would 
just "piss me off more," 
5. I asked Jeff to thing about his children and Jeff stated that he did not plan to 
see his children anymore. 
6. Jeff stated, "I will take out a bunch of people with me; Fm not going out by 
myself.5' 
7. Jeff talked about the need for the men in Utah to get angry enough to knock 
off the judges in order to remedy the way that justice is administered. 
8. Jeff that if he could "get" four to five people in Sanpete and Sevier County, 
and ccthey take me out...it's a betteT world and if I can take out their DNA 
offspring its even better," 
September 20, 2005 
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9. Jeff stated that he had confided in a buddy about his plans and his buddy 
replied that he wouldn't get caught, but he would go to Hell. 
10. Jeff called it a "damn good plan." 
11. Jeff stated that as far as Doug Neeley was concerned, he was going to "take 
away his kids." 
12. I asked Jeff for the name of his buddy, but he would not reveal it. I asked him 
to tell me what he planned to do and he stated, "go out with a bang." 
13. Jeff stated, "There will be justice; if I can get four or five, and they still catch 
me, Vm ahead." 
On September 19,2005. Jeff appeared in Judge Mower's courtroom for a hearing scheduled 
at 11:15 a.mu Jeff confronted Doug Neeley in the courtroom demanding that Mr. Neeley pay over 
to him $ 150,000.00. As he left the courthouse, Jeff stopped by the entrance door and told me "that 
asshole is going to die and all of his family." There was a bailiff standing across the room by the 
metal detector. There were a few witnesses and/or parties waiting along the benches across from the 
conference and court rooms. I do not know whether anyone else overheard Jeff s parting statement. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on unknown date) 
(Phone number dialed and ringing) 
MR. JOHNSON: Hello? 
MS. JELTE: Hi. Jeff, this is Joy Jelte. I didn't — 
MR. JOHNSON: How are you? 
MS. JELTE: I almost expected to get your answering 
machine. I just got the transcript from the court reporter 
for the hearing on Monday, but I don't have your checklist. I 
thought you were going to fax something to me. 
MR. JOHNSON: I really just don't have a fax — the only 
guestions I have is how come the Judge never addressed Neeley 
about the protective order. It's not addressed in it. 
MS. JELTE: Yeah. I think the way he addressed it was 
by dismissing it. 
MR. JOHNSON: And the only other thing is do I have to 
pay back alimony when she's still drawing from my 401-K? It all 
ought to be the same, because my 401-K stops back in March. 
day 
get 
MS. JELTE: Uh-huh. 
MR. JOHNSON: Or else my alimony should 
the decree is signed. 
MS. JELTE: Okay, wait. Say it again. 
MR. JOHNSON: She's still taking that — 
money out of my 401-K; it's $500 a ironth. 
MS. JELTE: Uh-huh. 
start from the 
- she'll still 
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1 MR. JOHNSON: That should go back to March. She'll be 
2 able to quit then, and I'll owe back alimony or else — yeah, 
3 whatever, start paying alimony from the time the decree is 
4 signed. 
5 MS. JELTE: Oh, okay. I apologize. I haven't looked 
6 at your file, and so I'm not real up to speed on what the issues 
7 are. I plan on doing that over the weekend, starting with first 
8 looking at the transcript and then going to the objection and 
9 then looking back at the other notes and so on. So I'm going to 
10 have to get up to speed on it before I do anything else. Are you 
11 going to be going to Richfield? 
12 MR. JOHNSON: For the Court date? 
13 MS. JELTE: Uh-huh. 
14 MR. JOHNSON: Yeah. 
15 MS. JELTE: Okay, because between now and then we'll 
16 probably need to talk probably once — once more about what the 
17 issues are and what position you want to take and so on. So — 
18 but I probably won't give you a call back until Sunday when I get 
19 into it a little bit more. 
20 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. 
21 MS. JELTE: I'm not going to spend that much time with 
22 it tonight other than to maybe glance at the transcript. 
23 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. 
24 MS. JELTE: I hope you're feeling better. 
25 MR. JOHNSON: It's just the same. It doesn't ever 
1 change. 
2 MS. JELTE: Well, you get to see Caden. That's good. 
3 MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, but do I want to see Caden? 
4 MS. JELTE: Sure, you do. 
5 MR. JOHNSON: I'm pretty much writing him off. 
6 MS. JELTE: Why is that? 
7 MR. JOHNSON: It's not worth it. It's not worth it 
8 every time I want to see him to have to go to Court or deal with 
9 attorneys to see him. 
10 MS. JELTE: When was the last time you saw him? 
11 MR. JOHNSON: July, 1st of July. So if she wants me 
12 miserable that's fine, but Caden — yeah, he'll get his child 
13 support, but he's not getting any inheritance and he's not 
14 getting a dad. That's that. I've had it. I'm totally out of 
15 this whole situation. 
16 MS. JELTE: Well, I don't think that that's the best way 
17 to handle your son. He cares about you a lot, and I think that 
18 you're a better dad than that. I know you're frustrated, but I 
19 think it will pass and I think you'll get on with your life and 
20 things will get better. 
21 MR. JOHNSON: But one thing about it, when he gets older 
22 he can ask questions why, and I'll tell him then, but I — you 
23 know, I'm not — I've had it. 
24 MS. JELTE: What about your other son? Have you seen 
25 him lately? 
-6-
1 MR. JOHNSON: Oh, I talk to him quite often. So yep, I 
2 think the Court system in Utah is screwed up. 
3 MS. JELTE: I know you feel that way right now, but it 
4 will — I think — 
5 MR. JOHNSON: You can't tell me in 20 years I'm going to 
6 feel it's right. I lost $200,000 and she made a profit. You 
7 can't tell me I'll think better about it in 20 years. 
8 MS. JELTE: No, I was saying you'd think — I think you 
9 need to wait and let us get through the emotions and everything. 
10 I think right now you're — 
11 MR. JOHNSON: The Judge hasn't ruled in on one thing to 
12 help me not one time, not either Judge. So no, I'm never going 
13 to come around. 
14 MS. JELTE: Well, I think Mower tries to do a good job, 
15 and — 
16 MR. JOHNSON: He's a slime ball. He's a liar and he's 
17 unethical, and he's going to have what's coming to him. 
18 MS. JELTE: I think — 
19 MR. JOHNSON: All of the Mowers — yeah, he's a 
20 hypocrite. He doesn't follow the law. He's the Judge. He 
21 doesn't follow the law. 
22 MS. JELTE: I think that when you — you need to reserve 
23 judgment until we get through this next hearing. 
24 MR. JOHNSON: Well, we'll see, but I'm — it's not going 
25 to change. I think Lyman is a piece of shit. 
- : . . ; • • - • • ; ; ' , - ; • , • • , • ; , ' , ' . . • - 7 -
,. MS. JELTE: I know it would have helped if he had heard 
your motion about the debts before you finally couldn't take it 
anymore and filed bankruptcy. I know that would have helped, but 
I — that Judge, too, Lyman, I think, tries to — 
MR. JOHNSON: How can the Judge sit there and think, 
okay, you have a hundred and some thousand dollars income, and 
you take half the income away and give the guy all the bills and 
have him pay it all and think, well, it's going to be rosy, and 
that go a year? Oh, but give her all the assets in the meantime. 
You know what? Fair and equitable, did that come into play at 
any time? I don't think so. No. 
./ MS. JELTE: Well, you still have the right to appeal, 
and that — 
MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, but what good is that going to do? 
:•>.;' MS. JELTE: That's — 
: MR. JOHNSON: Really. It's in Utah. 
MS. JELTE: — 20 days from the date that the decree is 
finally signed. 
MR. JOHNSON: I think, you know what, the better way — 
I have no faith in the Court system. I have no faith in it at 
all. The only way it's ever going to be fair is when people make 
it fair. 
MS. JELTE: Well — 
MR. JOHNSON: They go by the same principles everybody 
else is playing by. Does Neeley play by the rules? No. Does 
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1 the Court system play by the rules? Is the Court system fair? 
2 Do they follow the law? No, they don't. You've got Lyman 
3 signing — I'm not even represented, and he's signing bills. 
4 He's not following the law on judgments he's making. He's not 
5 following the law. So how can he expect people to follow the 
6 law if he refuses? It's not going to happen. 
7 MS. JELTE: Well, I think if you go back to that first 
8 hearing, I think you've forgotten about what she was testifying 
9 to about how she thought that the bills were generated because — 
10 from debt that you had acquired and that had been rolled over. 
11 I That's where Lyman was coming from. 
12 MR. JOHNSON: And so it's safe to say that the Court 
13 thinks that she should live in a house rent free, be able to 
14 pocket all the cash she wants and live rent free, free of any 
15 obligations for two years and be fine. She has no obligation. 
16 She wasn't paying for the house. The Court system is screwed. 
17 MS. JELTE: I think Judge Lyman — 
18 MR. JOHNSON: He's an asshole. 
19 MS. JELTE: Well, I think one of the reasons he got off 
2 0 the case had to do with concerns about that ex parte protective 
21 order and having Judge Mower hear it to have somebody fresh and 
22 anew to try to resolve the case. I think Mower tried. I think 
23 he missed some points, and that's what the hearing on Monday is 
24 about, is to try to get him to try to close up those holes in 
25 your case and get that resolved. 
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1 MR. JOHNSON: But the end judgment is not going to 
2 change. I'm still screwed. 
3 MS. JELTE: I think if you can just — let's get through 
4 this hearing. I think you'll feel better, and I think you'll 
5 feel a lot better and things will — 
6 MR. JOHNSON: Well — 
7 MS. JELTE: If you just give it some time and distance. 
8 Then if you want to pursue your appeal, fine, but — 
9 MR. JOHNSON: Maybe I'll appeal it, maybe I won't, but 
10 I don't have any faith in the legal system. I can handle it by 
11 myself, because you know what? Yeah, there's too much corruption. 
12 I've seen all — I've seen firsthand the corruption in Sevier 
13 County, and you know what? I'm not going to take it no more. 
14 After one, the rest are free. 
15 MS. JELTE: I'm sorry, what did you say? 
16 MR. JOHNSON: After one, the rest are free. 
17 MS. JELTE: Oh. 
18 MR. JOHNSON: I've had it. This has went as bad as it 
19 could — 
20 (Tape cuts out and then starts again) 
21 MS. JELTE: But your parents — 
22 MR. JOHNSON: And they can put me in jail. You know 
23 what? They can put me in jail for 60 days. They can put me in 
24 jail for a year, and all it's going to do is piss me off more. 
25 They can take away my guns, and all it's going to do is piss me 
\ • • . • • • . • ' • - • ; • • ' • ' • " - . ' • • ' . - ' • " ' " - 1 0 " 
1 off more. I've had it. It's injust, it's corrupt, and you know 
2 what? The legal system is so injust and corrupt, that I'm going 
3 to take care of it by myself. That's all there is to it. 
4 •; \ MS. JELTE: I think you need to be thinking about both 
5 of your children, and I think — . 
6 MR. JOHNSON: I'm not — I don't even plan on seeing 
7 both of my children anymore. I was a damn good dad, but this 
8 stage in the game, you know what? That's not even — I don't — 
9 you know what? It doesn't even matter. 
10 MS. JELTE: Jeff, are you suicidal right now? 
11 MR. JOHNSON: Only after I take out a bunch of people 
12 with me. I'm not going to go by myself. I can guarantee it. 
13 MS. JELTE: Well, you've got two really wonderful 
14 parents who love you dearly. 
15 MR. JOHNSON: And that's not the problem. 
16 MS. JELTE: No. 
17 MR. JOHNSON: The problem is the damn system. The 
18 problem is, she makes a profit and I go bust. The problem is 
19 my first attorney before I talked to you said, "Lyman has already 
20 judged on you because of the shit that Dale Eyre told him." You 
21 know what? Dale Eyre and the Judge are not even supposed to talk 
22 about me. 
23 MS. JELTE: You've got two beautiful children. 
24 , MR. JOHNSON: And I wrote them both off. 



























you need to think about how your decisions will affect those 
people. 
MR. JOHNSON: And you know what? If 20 years ago, if 5 
years ago, if 10 years ago men would stand up and say, "You know 
what? I'm tired of being screwed by Utah," and take action on 
their own, maybe somebody would say, "You know what? Maybe this 
isn't right. We're getting Judges knocked off left and right. 
Maybe this isn't right." 
MS. JELTE: It's called working with your Legislature 
and working — 
MR. JOHNSON: No, the law is just. When the Legislature 
says "fair and equitable," when they write a protective order 
and said if the person is attacked and they attack back in self-
defense, if they do something in self-defense then it shouldn't 
be held to a protective order. Then you look at Judge Lyman 
who says, "Oh, yeah, it's fine for somebody to attack in self-
defense, and if you respond back then it's malicious," he's not 
following the Legislature. Fair and equitable, I don't think 
anywhere in my case is fair and equitable. 
MS. JELTE: That's when you ta.-ce it up on appeal. 
MR. JOHNSON: No, that's — by — you know what? So I 
can spend 4 0 more thousand dollars and get it stuck up my ass 
again. No. 
MS. JELTE: The problem is is that what — if you — 
from — if you — 
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1 MR. JOHNSON: The only problem is, I don't care. If I 
2 can get four or five people in Sanpete and Sevier County and they 
3 take me out, it's a better world, isn't it? 
4 MS. JELTE: No, hon, that's — 
5 MR. JOHNSON: And if I can take out their DNA offspring, 
6 it's even better. 
7 MS. JELTE: Hon, that's not the way you solve the 
8 problem. 
9 MR. JOHNSON: It is at this point. 
10 MS. JELTE: No, because then all you're going to do is 
11 break your parents' heart and devastate your children, and your 
12 children will be — have this legacy that is horrible for them to 
13 face. You're too good a man for that. You're upset right now. 
14 MR. JOHNSON: No, I've been upset for years. I'm past 
15 upset. I want justice. 
16 MS. JELTE: Jeff, ever since I've met you you've been a 
17 real concerned dad about your children and what you wanted for 
18 them. 
19 MR. JOHNSON: It's past that. It's past that. The 
2 0 State of Utah doesn't give a shit about my kids. The -- you 
21 know what? Judge Lyman didn't give a fuck if I starved Jordan 
22 to death when I had him. He didn't care about kids. 
23 MS. JELTE: You would break your parents' heart and your 
24 children, and you know that. 
25 MR. JOHNSON: But if the world's a better place after I 
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1 leave, you know what? That's all that matters, right? 
2 MS. JELTE: I don't know what you're planning, hon, but 
3 I just — I want you not to do whatever it is you're thinking 
4 about, and I'm serious. 
5 MR. JOHNSON: You know what? I told my buddy about it. 
6 I've got a pretty close friend, and he told me — he said, "You 
7 know what, you're not going to get caught, but you're going to go 
8 to hell." It's worth it. 
9 MS. JELTE: I wish your friend had told you to — not 
10 to do whatever it is you're talking about doing. It doesn't 
11 sound like much of a friend to me. 
12 MR. JOHNSON: It's just you know what? You've got the 
13 make the world a better place. 
14 MS. JELTE: That's not making the world a better place. 
15 MR. JOHNSON: Of course it is. You know what? Once 
16 a Judge gets on the bench, they're held -- they don't have any 
17 accountability. You know what? If being an attorney is how bad 
18 you can screw somebody, and work outside the law and sit up there 
19 and lie, you know what? There's no accountability there. 
20 (Tape cuts out and then starts again) 
21 MR. JOHNSON: Guess what? 
22 MS. JELTE: Who's your friend that --
23 MR. JOHNSON: I'm that somebody. 
24 MS. JELTE: Who's your friend that's encouraging you to 
25 be stupid? 
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1 MR. JOHNSON: No, he's not encouraging me. He's telling 
2 me I'm going to hell; but it's a damn good plan, so you know 
3 what? 
4 MS. JELTE: Who are you talking about? 
5 MR. JOHNSON: Nobody. Nobody else needs to be in this. 
6 Neeley is an asshole. You know what? To this day if he wouldn't 
7 have took the steps that he took, I'm sure me and the ex could 
8 have got back together. 
9 MS. JELTE: I don't know that Corrinne — 
10 MR. JOHNSON: You know what, me — 
11 MS. JELTE: I don't know that Corrinne was asking him 
12 for advice on whether to reconcile. I think he was pretty 
13 shocked that you guys were trying to reconcile. 
14 MR. JOHNSON: Well, you know what? I don't really care. 
15 I know he distorted the facts. I know he's an asshole. I know 
16 he's had multiple affairs. So you know what? He's an asshole. 
17 If he's going to screw me for everything he can, for money, 
18 legal or not, you know, he'll do whatever he can, then he should 
19 anticipate me screwing him for every way I can, legal or not. If 
20 he has no ethics, he shouldn't expect people he's screwing to 
21 have ethics. You know, that's the bottom line. 
22 MS. JELTE: So — 
23 MR. JOHNSON: He took away my kids. I'll take away his 
24 kids. 
25 MS. JELTE: So what are you planning on doing, kiddo? 
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1 MR. JOHNSON: I don't think I'll tell you, you know. It 
2 won't benefit you, and I know it won't benefit me if I tell you. 
3 MS. JELTE: Well, I know one thing. You — I don't — 
4 it doesn't matter what you're talking about doing or what you're 
5 thinking about doing. You need to just not do it, and you need 
6 to — if you need to sit down with a counselor or somebody and 
7 talk to them about how angry and upset you are — 
8 MR. JOHNSON: Is that going to give me my $300,000 back? 
9 I don't think so. Is that going to make Neeley a better person? 
10 I don't think so. 
11 I MS. JELTE: But who cares about how Neeley is or who he 
12 is or what he does in the future? 
13 MR. JOHNSON: It's called justice. Why should I continue 
14 to sit idly by and let him fuck people ever, to let him do it to 
15 somebody else. I know with you it's •— you know, it's the job, 
16 it's the game; but with people involved it's not. 
17 MS. JELTE: I don't think that — 
18 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. If Neeley writes me a check for 
19 $150,000, I'll call it even with him. 
20 MS. JELTE: And what does the Judge have to do? 
21 MR. JOHNSON: Well, if he — let's see, the Judge. I 
22 think Sevier County Judge Mower, he's the one that signed the 
23 protective order for her to go remove everything except for my 
24 J personal shaving articles, and steel. He won't give them back. 
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MS. JELTE: Pardon me? 
MR. JOHNSON: I am not suicidal. Justice. It's not 
suicide. It's justice. 
MS. JELTE: I really am worried about you. 
MR. JOHNSON: Well, you know what, maybe people ought to 
follow the law. 
MS. JELTE: I'd like to see you — 
MR. JOHNSON: You know, in the whole Court situation 
maybe the Judge ought to consider, "Maybe I should follow the 
law." 
MS. JELTE: And so what are you — 
MR. JOHNSON: That's not going to happen. 
MS. JELTE: — going to do? 
MR. JOHNSON: Go out with a bang. 
MS. JELTE: No, you're not going to do that. Look — 
MR. JOHNSON: No. No, actually, I plan on — just 
justice, Joy. 
MS. JELTE: Look — 
MR. JOHNSON: Because the time they catch up with me, 
after one, the rest are free. Yep, I'll make my mark. 
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1 MR. JOHNSON: I have counseling for free, Joy. 
2 MS. JELTE: Well, then go. 
3 MR. JOHNSON: Why? They're not going to get my money 
4 back. You know what? I know what's right. I know what's just.' 
5 It just seems like everybody else has no idea.- 7v-'-.:-'.": 
6 . MS« JELTE: I know that whatever — if y o u — you know, 
7 if you — t h e other day you were talking about hurting Doug and 
8 you were talking about hurting the Judge, and you were talking 
9 about hurting — taking away property and family and so on. That 
10 is — all you're talking about is destruction. So how is that 
11 justice? It's not. 
12 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. When somebody takes away all my 
13 property, my family, everything I've worked for, $200,000, 
14 totally destroying me, what are they talking about? 
15 MS. JELTE: Well — 
16 MR. JOHNSON: And they don't follow the law to do it. 
17 MS. JELTE: You haven't pursued every avenue of appeal. 
18 MR. JOHNSON: Joy, how many hundreds of thousands of 
19 dollars can I afford in attorney fee — fees, which I'll never 
20 gain back. I'll never gain back. For what? How many hundreds 
21 of thousand dollars is it worth living my life hell to get back 
22 justice which they'll never pay the price for. There is no 
23 accountability on the other side. There's not. 
24 . M S . JELTE: And so you do something destructive, and you 
2 5 ruin your life and you ruin your kids' lives and you ruin your 
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1 parents' lives and — 
2 MR. JOHNSON: Well, you know what? You know what? At 
3 the end of the day, the people that are doing the same thing, 
4 they won't do it no more. 
5 MS. JELTE: The only --
6 MR. JOHNSON: This isn't something I just conjured up. 
7 MS. JELTE: I ™ 
8 MR. JOHNSON: I mean, I've been thinking about this 
9 since I've been living in Utah. I mean, it was good to move to 
10 New Mexico. I'm damn glad I did, but it's just — you know what? 
11 What's right is right. 
12 MS. JELTE: Your — Jeff, as far as I can tell, none of 
13 us have the moral right to pass judgment on another human being. 
14 MR. JOHNSON: But they have, haven't they? 
15 MS. JELTE: You can get on with your life. If you do 
16 something that ends the life of another person, you disrupt so 
17 much, not just your life, but their life and the people that love 
18 them — 
19 MR. JOHNSON: Boy, I'd hate to disrupt their life. 
20 MS. JELTE: — and the people that love you and are 
21 concerned about you and care about you. 
22 MR. JOHNSON: And I'm sure that all that consideration 
23 went into the judgments and into Court, didn't it? They was 
24 really concerned about how bad they destroyed me, wasn't they? 
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Well, Dale Eyre hasn't been 
Yes, he has. 
— your case in the last — 
Yes, he has. 
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1 MR. JOHNSON: Well, you know what? If I can get four or 
2 five and they catch me, so what? I'm still ahead. 
3 MS. JELTE: No, you're not ahead. 
4 MR. JOHNSON: Yeah, I am. 
5 MS. JELTE: No. Hon, look, I want you to just go talk 
6 to a counselor, okay? 
7 MR. JOHNSON: No. They're not going to give me back 
8 $200,000. Neeley is not going to give me back the money he 
9 screwed from me. The Judge sure as hell is not going to give 
10 me any money back. No. The day will come, and it won't be for 
11 awhile. The day will come there will be justice, and the world 
12 will be a better place. 
13 MS. JELTE: Well, as your attorney and your friend, 
14 I'm not going to give up on you. We're going to be talking about 
15 this hearing coming up Monday. I'm going to be talking with you 
16 and checking with you this weekend, because I just think you're 
17 just down right now. It may not feel like you're down, but I 
18 think — 
19 MR. JOHNSON: I've been down — 
20 MS. JELTE: — you're just depressed. 
21 MR. JOHNSON: — for three years. 
22 MS. JELTE: Well, what — 
23 MR. JOHNSON: I'm not depressed, Joy. I mean, after I 
24 get off the phone with you, it's Friday night, I'll go out and 









































JELTE: Well, then don't blow it. 
JOHNSON: Why? 
JELTE: Because — 
JOHNSON: There's no justice. There still has to be 
JELTE: Because — 
JOHNSON: There's none in Utah. 
JELTE: But you're not -- no — you're not the 
lould go around administering justice. 1 
JOHNSON: Then who is that — 
JELTE: I'm not the person — 
JOHNSON: Who is that person? Is it Judges that 





JELTE: Yeah, but you're talking — 
JOHNSON: Judges that refuse to follow the law? 
JELTE: You're talking about taking action to hurt 
somebody else. 
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in the west, 
don't kill p 
MR. 
JOHNSON: Did somebody take action against me to 
or no? 1 
JELTE: We don't live out in a — we may live out 
but we don't act like it. We don't carry guns, we 
eople, we don't harm property, and you know that. 
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just going to go on as usual. It's 
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1 I just going to keep happening to somebody else. Judges refuse to 
2 follow the law, and attorney — yep. You know what? It's got to 
3 end sometime. 
4 MS. JELTE: Look, I'm not going to get in an argument 
5 with you about this. I just think that you're just not thinking 
6 clearly, and I think you'll feel better after the next hearing, 
7 and I want you to snap out of it. 
8 I'm sincere as your friend, as your lawyer, as a friend 
9 to your parents, as a friend even to your kids, I really want you 
10 to snap out of it, Jeff. You know better. 
11 MR. JOHNSON: Well, I don't have anything planned in the 
12 near future. 
13 (Tape cuts out. No further proceedings on tape.) 
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFERY K JOHNSON, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO QUASH 
Case No: 051909162 
Judge: STEPHEN L HENRIOD 
Date: 06/26/2006 
Clerk: lynm 
The Defendant's Motion to Quash has been reviewed by the court and 
is denied. Whether or not Fixel adds an element to 78-8-316 (1) 
which is not in the statute the issue raised is a question for the 
jury. 
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Addendum E 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATB OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : Case No. 051909162 
v. : Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
JEFFERY K. JOHNSON, : Date: June 14, 2 006 
Defendant. : 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion in Limine. 
Having considered the memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court 
enters the following decision and finds that Defendant's Motion should 
'be DENIED. 
At issue here is whether an attorney is allowed to testify against 
a former client regarding threats the client allegedly made against a 
number of judges and conveyed to his attorney. Defendant concedes that 
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(1)1 allowed his attorney to 
report Defendant's alleged statement to law enforcement authorities in 
order to prevent Defendant from acting on the threats. However, 
Defendant argues that his alleged statements are still privileged and so 
his attorney cannot testify regarding them in Defendant's criminal 
prosecution. The State disagrees and argues that Defendant's statements 
were not privileged and, therefore, his attorney is allowed to disclose 
the statements during these criminal proceedings. 
The Court recognizes that this issue is one of first impression 
here in Utah. Additionally, there appears to be a split among the other 
limited jurisdictions that have addressed this issue. Therefore, the 
Court does not undertake this decision lightly. However, the Court 
finds that Defendant's statements were not privileged and Defendant's 
former attorney may testify against Defendant at his trial. 
It is clear that only n [c] onf idential disclosures by a client to an 
attorney made in order to obtain legal assistance are privileged. The 
purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure 
to their attorneys [in order to obtain fully informed legal advice.]" 
Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (internal citations omitted). 
Rule 1.6(b)(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides: 
(b) A lav/yers may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary: 
(l)(b) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm. 
~Z7M 
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achieve its purpose. Accordingly it protects only those disclosures -
necessary to obtain informed legal advice - which might not have been 
made absent the privilege." Id. 
Courts seem to have split on how to apply the attorney-client 
privilege in circumstances such as these, where a client allegedly makes 
threats regarding other individuals to his/her attorney. The Court, 
however, is persuaded by Aviles v. State, 165 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2005) and Hodgson Russ, LLP v. Trube, 867 So.2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2004). 
In Aviles, the court held that when client conveyed a threat to an 
interpreter, who conveyed the threat to the client's attorney, that 
communication was not privileged because it "was not made for the 
rendition of professional legal services and [was] therefore not covered 
by the attorney-client privilege." 165 S.W.2d at 439. Defendant argues 
that this case is distinguishable because the threat was made to an 
interpreter and not to the attorney. However, Aviles does seem 
applicable because the court found that it was not determinative whether 
the interpreter was a representative of the attorney because the 
information could not be privileged. Id. The court stated "Appellant's 
communication of a threat to kill his court-appointed interpreter can in 
no way be considered necessary to the rendition of legal services for 
his pending burglary trial. We hold that this communication of an 
intent to commit a crime is not covered by the attorney-client 
privilege, rendering irrelevant the role the interpreter may have been 
serving at the time of the communication." Id. 
Similarly, in Hodgson Russ, the court found that it was proper to 
admit an attorney's testimony against his client because "the threat 
[made by the client] was extraneous and was not a communication incident 
or necessary to obtaining legal advice." 867 So.2d at 1248. 
Defendant relies primarily on Purcell v. District Attorney, 676 
N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997). In Purcell, Mr. Tyree had gone to an attorney, 
Mr. Purcell, to discuss an employment matter. During the course of 
those discussions, Tyree made threats to burn down the apartment 
building where he had been employed. Id. at 437-38. Purcell considered 
these threats credible and reported them to the police. Id. at 438. 
After Tyree was indicted for attempted arson, the district attorney 
subpoenaed Purcell to testify. Purcell moved to quash the subpoena and 
that issue went up on appeal. Id. On appeal, the court found that 
there was no question regarding the ethical propriety of Purcell's 
disclosure of the threats to the police but that there was an issue 
regarding whether Purcell could testify at Tyree's arson trial. The 
court stated that the "attorney-client privilege applies only when the 
client's communication was for the purpose of facilitating the rendition 
of legal services. , . . A statement of an intention to commit a crime 
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made in the course of seeking legal advice is protected by the 
privilege, unless the crime-fraud exception applies. That exception 
applies only if the client or prospective client seeks advice or 
assistance in furtherance of criminal conduct." Id. at 115. The court 
went on to find that Tyree's communication to Purcell was privileged, 
saying, "Unless the crime-fraud exception applies, the attorney-client 
privilege should apply to communications concerning possible future, as 
well as past, criminal conduct, because an informed lawyer may be able 
to dissuade the client from improper future conduct and, if not, under 
the ethical rules may elect in the public interest to make a limited 
disclosure of the client's threatened conduct." Id. at 116. 
Defendant also relies on Kleinfeld v. State, 568 So.2d 937 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1990), which held that it was error to require an 
attorney to testify about his client's statement: "They [the police] 
know I did [murdered] Eric. I've got nothing to lose by doing you and 
then turning the gun on myself" because the statement was privileged. 
Id. at 939-40. However, Kleinfeld was later distinguished in Florida by 
Hodgson Russ, which stated that Kleinfeld applied only to cases where 
a privileged communication was admitted to prove an admission to a 
previous crime. 867 So.2d at 1248. It did not apply when the 
attorney's testimony would be admitted to prove that the client intended 
to commit a future murder. Id. 
The Court finds Aviles and Hodgson Russ more persuasive than 
Purcell for a number of reasons. First, Aviles seems more in line with 
Utah's current recognition of attorney-client privilege. Specifically, 
in Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 27 Utah 2d 310, 315, 495 P. 2d 1254 
(1972), the court, citing to U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery, 89 F.Supp. 
357 (D. Mass. 1950), said that a party asserting privilege has the 
burden of showing that the communication between attorney and client was 
"for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or 
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding." 
Additionally, Utah Rule of Evidence 504(a)(6) provides: "A communication 
is *confidential' if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other 
than those to whom the disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of 
professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary 
for the transmission of the communication." Subsection (b) of Rule 504 
goes on to say: "A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to 
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications 
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal 
services to the client between the client and the client's 
representatives, lawyers . . . ." It is clear that Utah holds that not 
everything a person says to his attorney is necessarily privileged. A' 
person can make statements to his attorney which are not privileged 
because they are not made for the purpose of facilitating legal 
services. In the present case, Defendant did not make the threats to 
his attorney for the "purpose of facilitating the rendition of 
professional legal services." He did not seek legal advice, an opinion 
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regarding his potential actions, etc.2 While Defendant was represented 
by counsel when he made the alleged threats, his threats did not at all 
relate to counsel's representation of him. Therefore, the statements 
seem to fall under Jackson, et. al., which would exclude them from 
privilege. 
Second, Aviles/Hodgson Russ are the most recent efforts of courts 
to resolve this issue and seem to represent a growing trend in favor of 
finding threats unprotected by attorney/client privilege. 
Finally, Aviles/Hodgson represent a more compelling policy interest 
than Purcell. Purcell argues that, in order to protect the 
attorney/client privilege, all statements made to attorneys must be 
afforded protections that they would not ordinarily be afforded. 
Aviles/Hodgson recognize that attorney/client privilege can be 
adequately protected by affording maximum protection to statements that 
are made in the context of the attorney/client relations, i.e., 
statements that are made to facilitate legal services. However, 
statements that are not made to facilitate legal services are not 
properly protected under attorney/client privilege. This services the 
interest of the attorney/client privilege while still supporting other 
important policy considerations such as facilitating prosecution of 
criminal behavior. •..•-,, 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion 
in Limine should be DENIED because the attorney-client privilege does 
not bar Ms. Jelte from testifying at Def e n da nt'r serial. 





 Strangely, if Defendant had sought legal advice in order to further his alleged intended crimes, his statements 
would not be privileged according to Purcell. This could lead to the odd result that statements made in furtherance of 
receiving advice would not be protected, while statements not made in furtherance of receiving advice would be 
protected. 
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